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We examine possible causal structures of experiments with entangled quantum
objects. Previously, these structures have been obscured (i) by assuming a mis-
leading probabilistic analysis of quantum non locality as ‘Outcome Dependence or
Parameter Dependence’ and (ii) by directly associating these correlations with in-
fluences. Here we try to overcome these shortcomings: (i) we proceed from a recent
stronger Bell argument (Na¨ger, 2012), which provides an appropriate probabilistic
description, and (ii) apply the rigorous methods of causal graph theory. Against
the standard view that there is only an influence between the measurement out-
comes, we show that there must be an influence from one setting (parameter) to
its distant outcome: EPR correlations can only come about if one of the outcomes
is a common effect of both settings. Our discussion makes explicit under which as-
sumptions similar conclusions from information theoretic considerations (Maudlin
2002, ch. 6; Pawlowski et al. 2010) can be interpreted causally.
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1 Introduction
Modern EPR experiments measure the polarisation of entangled photons (Einstein et al.,
1935; Bohm, 1951; Aspect et al., 1982; Weihs et al., 1998). In a schematic setup a
source is located midway between two measurement devices. Suitably prepared, the
source emits a pair of entangled photons (in the quantum state ψ), which move in
opposite direction towards the measurement devices. While the photons are on their
way, the measurement directions of the devices (‘settings’, ‘parameters’) are randomly
and independently set to one of two possible values (a = 1, 2 and b = 2, 3). Finally, each
apparatus registers whether the photon is polarised in that direction or not (α = ± and
β = ±).1 The statistics of many repeated measurement runs yields that the outcomes
are correlated conditional on the settings and the quantum state, ¬ I(α,β|a, b,ψ), the
famous EPR correlations.2
It is a basic assumption in scientific reasoning that correlations have to be explained.
On the one hand, these correlations can be derived from the quantum mechanical form-
alism by Born’s rule,3 which provides a perfect covering law explanation. On the other
hand, it is well-known today that covering law explanations can be dissatisfying in dif-
ferent respects (see, e.g., Salmon, 1990). It has become an approved position in the
philosophy of science that explaining a phenomenon in a satisfying sense requires to
explain it causally, i.e. to tell a story how it comes about (Salmon, 1984, 1998). How
do EPR correlations come about? An essential part of such causal explanations is to
say which properties of the considered events influence which (‘causal structure’). Since
in our description of EPR experiments we have used the usual convention to represent
1We shall use the convention to denote variables in bold fonts, e.g. α, and corresponding values of
variables in normal font, e.g. α; specific values of variables are indicated by an index, e.g. α+.
2Assuming a maximally entangled state, e.g. ψ = 1√
2
(|+〉|+〉+ |−〉|−〉), the correlations are given by
P (αβ|abψ) =
{
1
2
cos2 φab if α = β
1
2
sin2 φab if α 6= β.
(1)
3 In the present case, Born’s rule reads: P (αβ|abψ) = |〈φa, φb|ψ〉|2.
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properties as values of variables, the question for the causal structure is: which of the
variables of an EPR setup influence which? This is the question we shall try to answer
in this paper.
Tackling this question we shall not engage in metaphysical debates about the nature of
causation or of quantum non-locality. Rather we understand the question in an epistemic
sense: according to normal standards of causal inference, which influences does one have
to assume in order to explain the EPR correlations? When we speak of ‘causal relations’
and ‘causal structures’ in the following, we shall always mean ‘causal’ in an epistemic
sense (if not otherwise stated). The epistemic causal structures we shall find leave open
how the influences are metaphysically realised—which is a different question and cannot
be treated here.4
In recent decades, the epistemology of causation has made considerable progress due
to causal graph theory, which is summarised in the impressive work of Spirtes et al. (2000)
and Pearl (2000). Causal graph theory represents causal structures by diagrams which
involve variables as nodes and causal relations as arrows. Causal graphs normally do
not involve cycles of arrows; they are directed acyclic graphs. We shall present possible
causal structures of EPR experiments in graphs which have the empirically accessible
variables α, β, a, b, ψ as nodes (plus a possible hidden variable λ). Causal graphs are
a clear way to provide answers to our question. This is one virtue of causal graph theory.
The main distinction when discussing causal structures for a given correlation between
variables α and β (here: the measurement outcomes of EPR experiments) is whether it
comes about by direct causation (direct cause structure), or by a common cause (common
cause structure) or by both (mixed structure). Since in a typical EPR experiment the
measurements are space like related (see fig. 1), only common cause structures can be
local; but it is a common place that due to the violation of the Bell inequalities local
common cause structures cannot explain the correlations (fig. 2). This is still true even if
one accounts for the possibility that there might be hidden variables, a hidden common
cause λ of the outcomes, which complete the quantum state ψ at the source. In some
sense there must be a non-local causal connection, either a direct connection between
the outcomes (fig. 3) or a causal relation from one setting to its distant outcome (this
setting is a non-local common cause of both outcomes; fig. 4), or both (fig. 5). Finally,
there are two further special cases of common cause structures. According to indirect
structures the settings influence the outcomes only via a hidden common cause λ of
the outcomes (fig. 6). An interesting subclass of indirect structures are retro-structures:
here the hidden common cause λ lies in the common past of the settings, so that the
influence is backwards in time. Finally, superdeterministic structures assume that the
4However, the two questions are clearly connected: we believe that the metaphysical question can
best be answered only when we have found a suitable epistemic causal structure. Epistemic causal
structures, we maintain, are our best guide to metaphysical structure (by inference to the best
explanation). Speculating about the metaphysical nature of quantum non-locality, as it has been
common in the philosophical literature, without having determined exactly which variables influence
another according to epistemic standards, does not seem to be a reliable procedure. So the present
paper is also meant to create a sound basis for metaphysical explorations.
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hidden state is not only a common cause of the outcomes but also of the settings (fig. 7).5
ba
α β
ψ
x
t
Fig. 1: Schematic space-time diagram of EPR experiments. Each outcome is time-like
separated to a local setting (α and a, β and b) and to the quantum state at the
source, ψ. Any other pair of variables—particularly the outcomes—is space-like
separated. Note that we have not marked the location of the hidden common
cause λ—for in principle it can be located anywhere. If it plays the role of hidden
variables, however, it must be situated in the common past of the outcomes (as
ψ).
These six structures are prototypes for causal structures of EPR experiments. Rather
than an exhaustive set of possible structures they are the main variants which have been
proposed. To each prototype it is easy to find similar structures which fall into the
same class, e.g. replace α ← β in figure 23 by α → β. (We shall call such structures
which ‘mirror’ all arrows at the symmetry axis of the experiment ‘mirror images’. If
an asymmetric structure is allowed or forbidden it is understood that its mirror image,
which we shall not explicitly indicate, is allowed or forbidden as well.) One can also
have structures which are a mix of two or more prototypes. In our argument below we
shall be more precise about these variants. Here, in order to get an overview, we shall
constrain our discussion to these prototypes.
Superdeterministic structures have not received much credit, although they constitute
the only type of structures which can be completely local (if the hidden variable is in the
common past of the settings) and violate Bell inequalities. Claiming that the settings
which are determined by the experimenter are in effect influenced by a hidden variable
5Sua´rez (2004, 2007) and Wood and Spekkens (2012) have provided a similar overview of suggested
causal structures for EPR experiments.
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Prototypes of possible causal structures for EPR experiments
ba
α β
ψ λ
lokal
Fig. 2: Local common cause structure
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 3: Direct cause structure
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 4: Non-local common cause structure
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 5: Mixed structure
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 6: Indirect structure
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 7: Superdeterministic structure
(NB: Here and in the following printing some arrows bold is just for reasons of clarity.
There is no difference in meaning between bold and normal arrows.)
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they have always provoked the charge of being a conspiratorial theory. We shall not
consider these structures as a serious candidate.
Among the four remaining structures indirect structures have played only the role of a
minority view. In the form of retro-structures they have attracted some attention (Price,
1996). Most philosophers of science interpret the violation of Bell inequalities to show
that EPR experiments involve a non-locality of some kind. The non-locality following
from Bell’s inequality (the failure of the factorisation condition) is on the probabilistic
level. Jarrett (1984) famously analysed this quantum non-locality as the disjunction
of two probabilistic dependencies, ‘Outcome Dependence or Parameter Dependence’,
suggesting that there is a choice to be made. The predominant criterion for preferring
one dependence over the other is the compatibility with relativity: by different arguments
(Jarrett, 1984; Shimony, 1984; Arntzenius, 1994) it has been claimed that Parameter
Dependence is in conflict with relativity while Outcome Dependence is not. This result,
which is still on a probabilistic level, is then interpreted causally by associating the
dependencies with influences: influences between a setting and its distant outcome are
inconsistent with relativity, whereas such between the outcomes are not. This rules
non-local common cause structures as well as mixed structures out. Rather, according
to this standard view, EPR correlations come about by a non-local influence from one
outcome to the other (direct cause structure).6
In this paper we shall argue that this standard view is deeply flawed. The argument
we shall present will have the opposite conclusion: EPR experiments cannot have a direct
cause structure. For we shall show that direct cause structures imply Bell inequalities,
just as local structures do. Thus, for mathematical reasons, direct cause structures
cannot explain correlations of the outcomes which are as strong as EPR correlations.
Our positive claim will be that Bell inequalities can only be violated if at least one of
the outcomes is a common effect of both settings. This means that there must be a
causal path from at least one of the settings to its distant outcome. This path can be
a direct influence (non-local common cause structure), and it might additionally involve
an influence between the outcomes (mixed structure), or it is indirect via the hidden
variable (indirect structure). In this paper, we shall leave open which of these three
possible prototypes likely is the true one. The crucial point here is to show against the
standard view that direct structures cannot hold.
The normal way to find causal graphs for a given probability distribution is via causal
discovery algorithms (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2000). In EPR experiments, however,
these algorithms cannot be applied because one of their preconditions, the so called
6We should note that the standard view has it that, metaphysically, this influence between the outcomes
is grounded in a non-causal relation, either a non-causal influence (‘passion at-a-distance’, Shimony
1984; Redhead 1987) or a holistic ‘non-separability’ (Howard 1989; Teller 1986; Jarrett 1989; Healey
1991, 1994). There is an ongoing debate whether Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation judges
the outcomes to be causally connected (Butterfield, 1992) or not (Glynn and Kroedel, forthcoming).
We stress, however, that in our epistemic scheme, which is insensitive to metaphysical realisation, we
count any alleged influence as a causal relation. For our question here is which variable influences
which—not whether a given influence is causal or not. Thus, not any arrow in the causal diagrams
we shall consider necessarily is meant to represent a causal relation in a metaphysical sense; the
influence it represents might well be due to a different kind of relation.
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faithfulness assumption, is violated (Glymour, 2006; Wood and Spekkens, 2012). Hence,
we have to approach the causal structure in a rather unusual way: we shall give Bell’s
theorem, which is an argument on the probabilistic level, a causal interpretation.
We shall not use Bell’s theorem in its standard form, which says that any non-
local theory can violate Bell inequalities. For this view has recently been shown to be
wrong (Na¨ger, 2012): a stronger version of Bell’s theorem makes explicit that certain
non-local theories still imply Bell inequalities, among them outcome dependent theories.
Jarrett’s choice (‘Outcome Dependence or Parameter Dependence’) is misleading because
outcome dependent theories cannot violate Bell inequalities. Proceeding from this false
assumption is the main failure of the standard view. We shall overcome this drawback
by interpreting the new stronger Bell argument.
Moreover, we shall avoid the standard view’s problematic identification of certain
probabilistic dependencies with influences. Rather we shall use the clear principles of
causal graph theory, which allow to infer statistical properties from causal structures
(and, vice versa, to infer causal structures from statistical data). Providing clear trans-
lation principles is another virtue of causal graph theory. It is of particular importance
because the transition in both directions is susceptible to many fallacies, ranging from
naive identifications of statistical dependence with causal dependence (correlation is not
causation) up to subtleties about non-faithful representations. A causal interpretation
of Bell’s theorem by causal graph theory will reveal that also in this case the association
of statistical dependencies with influences, such as Outcome Dependence with an influ-
ence between the outcomes, is plainly false. This is a second drawback of the standard
view. In this sense, our argument shall make explicit the two crucial points at which the
argument for the standard view fails.
We should not start before noting that our conclusion has a considerable similarity
with certain non-standard views about EPR experiments, which are based on information
theoretic considerations. It has been shown that information about the distant outcome
does not suffice to explain EPR correlations:
Bell’s inequality can reliably be violated only when the response of one of the
particles depends (at least sometimes) on the question asked its partner. [. . . ]
[D]ependence on the distant polarizer setting is crucial. Jarrett’s division of theor-
ies into those that violate outcome independence and those that violate parameter
independence is again seen to be misleading: any successful theory must postulate
some influence of a distant ‘parameter’ (i.e. the polarizer angle) on the response
of a local photon. Without such dependence the quantum statistics cannot be
recovered. (Maudlin, 2002, p. 182f)
. . . it is impossible to model a violation [of the Bell inequalities] without having
information in one laboratory about both the setting and the outcome at the distant
one. While it is possible that outcome information can be revealed from shared
hidden variables, [. . . ] the setting information must be non-locally transferred.
(Pawlowski et al., 2010)
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Both Maudlin and Pawlowski et al. agree that at least one of the outcomes must depend
on the information about the distant setting. Since the information about the local set-
ting is assumed to be available anyway, this amounts to saying that one of the outcomes
must depend on the information about both settings.
This result in terms of information seems very similar to the causal claim we shall
establish that at least one of the outcomes must be a common effect of both settings.
Indeed, Maudlin directly attaches a causal reading to his result (‘influence’). (Pawlowski
et al. are more cautious, speaking only of information which is ‘transferred’.) It is not
clear, however, whether Maudlin’s leap from ‘depending on the information of’ to ‘is
influenced by’ is sound. As the transition from statistical to causal facts, that transition
might be liable to different fallacies. Under what conditions is our result equivalent to
Maudlin’s and Pawlowski’s? We shall give an answer at the end of this paper. It will
turn out that very similar principles which correctly translate probabilistic dependence
to causal dependence also translate informational dependence to causal dependence. The
result will be that the two approaches—the information theoretic approach by Maudlin
and Pawlowski et al. and ours via Bell inequalities—converge: they yield the same
causal structures. This will be another strong argument in favour of our claim against
the standard view.
The paper is organised in two parts. We first apply causal graph theory to the
standard Bell argument. The rough result of this argument is well known (one must
have any non-local theory in order to violate Bell inequalities), but it will allow to
introduce the causal principles and to demonstrate our concept of causal interpretation
at a moderately complicated level. It will also bring home our first point against the
standard view that one should not identify singular probabilistic dependencies with
influences. In a second part, we shall then apply the same principles to the stronger
Bell argument. It will prove our negative main result in opposition to the standard view
that direct cause structures cannot violate Bell inequalities. We shall also make precise
which positive features causal structures must have in order to be able to account for
a violation. Finally, we shall show in what sense our result is in accordance with the
information theoretic considerations of Maudlin and Pawlowski et al.
2 A causal interpretation of Bell’s theorem
Bell’s theorem is a mathematical theorem. In its most general form, it is an argument
formulated in probabilistic language. It says that a set of certain probabilistic condi-
tions is in conflict with the empirical results of EPR experiments. Hence, one of the
probabilistic conditions must be false. Typically, however, Bell’s theorem is said to show
certain deep causal or metaphysical facts. How does this work, if the premisses and
the conclusion are on a probabilistic level? The answer is that the probabilistic con-
ditions receive a causal or metaphysical interpretation. In this section we shall show
why the standard way to interpret Bell’s theorem, viz. to identify singular probabilistic
facts with causal or metaphysical meaning, is wrong. We shall present a reliable way
to endow Bell’s theorem with meaning: the clear principles of causal graph theory will
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provide a sound interpretation. This will also make explicit that Bell’s theorem allows
not only for the standard reading that local causal structures are ruled out but also for
other interpretations.
2.1 What is a causal interpretation?
Let us start by stating Bell’s theorem in an explicit form. The probabilistic assumptions
underlying the theorem are:
Local Factorisation: P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|aψλ)P (β|bψλ)
Probabilistic Autonomy: P (λ|abψ) = P (λ|ψ)
These two assumptions imply the Bell inequalities (see, e.g., Bell 1975, van Fraassen
1989 or Shimony 1990), which are violated by EPR correlations. Thus, at least one
of the probabilistic assumptions that imply the inequality must be false. Here is the
argument in an explicit form:
(P1) Autonomy and Local Factorisation imply Bell inequalities:
(A) ∧ (LF)→ (BI)
(P2) Bell inequalities are empirically violated: ¬(BI)
(C1) Autonomy or Local Factorisation fails: ¬(A) ∨ ¬(LF)
(from P1 & P2, MT)
What does a failure of the probabilistic conditions autonomy and Local Factorisation
mean? The usual interpretation is to directly attach a meaning to each probabilistic
condition. Local Factorisation, for instance, is said to be a locality condition required
by relativity (e.g. Bell, 1975; Jarrett, 1984): it guarantees that there are no influences
between space-like separated variables. So its failure is meant to show that there is
a non-local influence of some kind. Jarrett’s analysis of Local Factorisation seems to
paint an even more detailed picture: the failure of Local Factorisation is equivalent
to the disjunction of the probabilistic conditions Outcome Dependence and Parameter
Dependence. While the former is believed to constitute a (non-causal, in a metaphysical
sense) influence between the outcomes the latter is taken to be an influence between a
setting and its distant outcome.
These interpretations, however, are highly questionable. For what we have in all these
cases is a more or less direct association of singular probabilistic conditions with causal
(or metaphysical) claims. Yet, it is well-known that correlation is not causation, and
that probabilistic independence does not necessarily mean causal independence. How
can we do better?
In the following we shall propose a much more reliable way to assign causal meaning
to Bell’s theorem. The idea is to add an interpretation premise to the argument:
(P0) The causal assumptions (X) imply autonomy and Local Factorisation:
(X)→ (A) ∧ (LF)
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Here (X) stands for a set of causal assumptions which by the approved principles and
methods of causal graph theory imply the probabilistic conditions autonomy and Local
Factorisation. Using causal graph theory will put the problematic transition from causal
facts to probabilistic facts on a solid basis. Since the overall argument has a modus tollens
structure, the new premise will have the effect that not only one of the probabilistic
assumptions has to fail, (C1), but also one of the causal assumptions cannot be true:
(C2) (X) fails: ¬(X) (from P0 & C1)
This will give the argument a clear causal conclusion. The task in the following is to
find a set of causal assumptions which imply autonomy and Local Factorisation.
2.2 A set of causal assumptions
We start by considering possible causal structures among the five empirical variables
which describe an EPR experiment. Without further assumptions one could in principle
have a causal relation between any pair of these variables. This does not seem plausible,
but why? If we are not willing to accept any causal relation, we need principles which
restrict causal relations in such EPR experiments.
A first observation might be that in EPR experiments the settings and the quantum
state are controlled variables: each is set by an intervention to a certain value. We
have furthermore assumed that these interventions occur independently of one another:
while the quantum state is prepared identically in every run, each setting is randomly
chosen. As a consequence, these variables are statistically independent: P (abψ) =
P (a)P (b)P (ψ). My suggestion is to assume that variables which fulfil these criteria
cannot be effects of other variables in the causal structure. If they were, they would either
be overdetermined or they were actually not controlled (contrary to our assumption).
Hence, such variables cannot be effects in the given set of variables, they can only
be causes—which is the definition of an exogenous variable. These considerations are
captured by the following principle:
Exogeneity of Controlled Variables (ECV): Controlled variables, which
are set by independent interventions, are exogenous.
This principle seems so plausible to me that I shall not put it into question throughout
this paper. It restricts possible causal structures for EPR experiments considerably, viz.
to involve only those relations shown in figure 8. Note that, especially, the principle
forbids any causal relation between the controlled variables themselves.
A second constraint comes from relativity theory, the famous locality condition. In a
causal formulation it says:
Causal Einstein Locality (CEL): There are no direct causal relations
between space-like separated events.
The principle has three possible justifications from relativity theory. One says that
according to relativity, causal processes are bound to matter-energy, but matter en-
ergy cannot travel faster than light. A second reason is the fact that well-known loop-
paradoxes can arise if superluminal signalling were possible. Hence, space-like causal
10
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relations which allow for signalling are definitely forbidden. A third reason might be
that the temporal asymmetry of causation (causes precede their effects) must be true
in all frames of reference. In a relativistic space-time, however, this feature would fail.
For if two space-like separated events stand in a causal relation, A causes B, there are
always frames of reference in which B is prior to A. So Einstein locality seems to be a
well-founded principle as well. It forbids any direct causal relation between the two wings
of the experiment. The maximal set of causal relations we can still have, if we assume
these two restricting principles, is shown in figure 9: a local common cause structure.
ba
α β
ψ
Fig. 8: Possible causal relations if ECV
holds. (or α ← β instead of
α→ β)
ba
α β
ψ
Fig. 9: Possible causal relations if ECV
and CEL hold.
We should note, however, that one can circumvent the restrictions that the locality
principle imposes, without violating it, if one allowed for backwards causation, i.e. if
one allowed that for a pair of time-like separated events A and B the cause A occurs
later than the effect B. Then we could have an influence, say, from b to α, mediated by
a variable µ in their common past, as shown in figure 10. Such backwards causation,
however, is highly questionable. Some authors argue that backwards causation is a logical
impossibility: the causal asymmetry is conceptually related to the time asymmetry, i.e.
causes are always temporarily prior to their effects. Second, even if backwards causation
were conceptually possible, it might yield inconsistencies because it enables the coming
about of causal loops. Hence, it is plausible to assume:
No Backwards Causation (NBC): Effects cannot precede their time-like
separated causes.
With this additional assumption, we now can be sure that no variable on one wing of
the experiment is an effect of a variable on the other. We must have the local common
cause structure represented in figure 9.
So far for principles which restrict possible causal relations. In order to draw math-
ematical conclusions from causal structures, we still need a principle which translates
causal structures to probabilistic facts. The most common principle for this task is the
11
2 A causal interpretation of Bell’s theorem
ba
α β
ψ
μ
Fig. 10: Causal structure with backwards
causation via a latent intervening
variable µ.
ba
α β
ψ
Fig. 11: The structure in fig. 10 omitting
the latent intervening variable µ.
Causal Markov Condition (Spirtes et al. 2000, p. 29f; Pearl 2000, p. 19). It derives prob-
abilistic independence claims from causal structures and is used in nearly all methods
of causal inference. It says:
Causal Markov Condition (CMC): A variable A in a given causal struc-
ture is probabilistically independent of its non-effects B conditional on its
direct causes C:
I(A,B|C) :↔ ∀A,B,C : P (A|BC) = P (A|C) (2)
Note that in general B and C are sets of variables, B := {B1, . . . ,Bn} and C :=
{C1, . . . ,Cm}.
Applying the Causal Markov Condition to the local causal structure would yield the
corresponding probabilistic independencies. For this derivation to be correct, however,
we have to make sure that we have not forgotten any common cause in our set of
variables, because omitting common causes yields independencies which, in fact, do not
hold. Given ECV, a hidden common cause λ might only be a common cause of the
outcomes (fig. 12). Due to the locality condition it would have to be be located in the
common past of the outcomes. These restrictions fit very well with the idea of hidden
variables, which have been a speculation since the early days of quantum mechanics
(Einstein et al., 1935; Schro¨dinger, 1935). Hidden variables have been thought to provide
a more detailed description of the quantum state (here: the photon state at the source),
endowing each of the entangled photons with well-defined properties and removing the
indeterminacy in their behaviour.
Thus, we allow for one latent common cause λ, which possibly accounts for hidden
variables of the photons at the source. We stress, however, that by definition λ essentially
just is a latent common cause of the outcomes: it neither does have to describe hidden
variables nor does it have to be located in the common past of the outcomes when we
12
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give up on the locality assumption below. We assume that there are no hidden common
causes apart from λ. Having included all true common causes is usually called ‘Causal
Sufficiency’ in the literature on causal graphs (Spirtes et al., 2000, p. 22):
Causal Sufficiency1 (CS1): The variable set V1 = {α,β,a, b,ψ,λ} con-
tains all common causes of any two (or more) variables in V1.
(Here the index in ‘V1’ indicates the number of hidden common causes in the set, and
is referred to in ‘Causal Sufficiency1’.)
ba
α β
ψ λ
lokal
Fig. 12: Local causal structure with hid-
den variable λ
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 13: Non-local causal structure with
the hidden variable as common
effect of the settings.
Note that λ is neither known nor controlled. Hence, ECV does not secure that the
hidden variable is exogenous. It would be perfectly consistent with ECV that they
are acted upon by other variables. In the present set of assumptions, however, it is
the locality assumption which excludes that, possibly, the settings act non-locally on
the hidden variables (figure 13), while No Backwards Causation forbids that there is a
directed path from one outcome to the other via the hidden variable in their common
past. (Later, when we shall give up on these assumptions, we will come back to this
fact, that the hidden variable can be acted upon.)
We are now ready to derive probabilistic consequences from the five causal assump-
tions we have just introduced. Applying the Causal Markov Condition to the local
common cause structure in figure 9 yields the following probabilistic independencies:
I(a, {ψ,λ, b,β}) (3)
I(b, {ψ,λ,a,α}) (4)
I(ψ, {λ,a, b}) (5)
I(λ, {ψ,a, b}) (6)
I(α, {b,β}|{a,ψ,λ}) (7)
I(β, {a,α}|{b,ψ,λ}) (8)
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From (6)–(8) we can now very easily derive autonomy and Local Factorisation, the two
probabilistic assumptions which are needed for Bell’s theorem.7
So we have found a set (X) of causal assumptions which imply the probabilistic
conditions entailing Bell inequalities. This makes the interpretation premise (P0), that
we have added to Bell’s argument, explicit. The five causal assumptions are the causal
interpretation of Bell’s theorem we have been looking for. The complete argument,
including the causal interpretation, reads:
(P0) Exogeneity of Controlled Variables, the Causal Markov Condition, Causal
Sufficiency1, Causal Einstein Locality and No Backwards Causation imply
Probabilistic Autonomy and Local Factorisation:
(ECV) ∧ (CMC) ∧ (CS1) ∧ (CEL) ∧ (NBC)→ (A) ∧ (LF)
(P1) Probabilistic Autonomy and Local Factorisation imply Bell inequalities:
(A) ∧ (LF)→ (BI)
(P2) Bell inequalities are empirically violated: ¬(BI)
(C1) Probabilistic Autonomy or Local Factorisation fails: ¬(A) ∨ ¬(LF)
(from P1 & P2, MT)
(C2) At least one of the following principles fails: Exogeneity of Controlled Vari-
ables or the Causal Markov Condition or Causal Sufficiency1 or Causal Ein-
stein Locality or No Backwards Causation:
¬(ECV) ∨ ¬(CMC) ∨ ¬(CS1) ∨ ¬(CEL) ∨ ¬(NBC)
(from P0 & C1, MT)
In this formulation, Bell’s theorem involves two levels: a probabilistic and a causal
one. The sub-argument from (P1) and (P2) to (C1) is the usual Bell argument on the
probabilistic level. Here we have complemented it by a causal interpretation (P0) which
yields a causal conclusion (C2).
7The derivation uses two of the semi-graphoid axioms for conditional independence relations (see Pearl,
2000, p. 11):
(8) ∧ ‘decomposition axiom’⇒ I(β,a|{b,ψ,λ}) (9)
(6) ∧ ‘weak union axiom’⇒ I(λ, {a, b}|ψ) (10)
(10) just is autonomy, and (7) and (9) imply Local Factorisation:
P (αβ|abψλ)
product
rule= P (α|βabψλ)P (β|abψλ) (11)
(7),(9)
= P (α|aψλ)P (β|bψλ) (12)
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2.3 Disentangling causal structure from spatio-temporal realisation
The causal result (C2) shows that the standard conclusion from Bell’s theorem that there
is a non-local influence, ¬(CEL), is not without alternative. In fact, it is just one in five
different possible conclusions. The Bell argument might have different conclusions and
our arguments explicitly presents the possible options.
There are two problems. First, which of the five causal assumptions is the one that
fails? As the Bell argument in itself does not tell, one would have to invoke further
arguments (or criteria). For instance, if one opts for the non-locality horn, one has to
have good reasons why the other assumptions hold. However, we shall not discuss at
this point which of the assumptions fails. The reason is that this will be easier to treat
given the conclusion of the stronger Bell argument that we shall present in the following
section. For in the stronger form some of the assumptions, that have been necessary
here, turn out to be dispensable (so there will be fewer options).
The second problem is that even if knew that it is locality which fails this would
leave us with several options for our question concerning the causal structure: either
there could be a non-local influence between the outcomes, or between a setting and its
distant outcome, or between a setting and the hidden variable. Thus, a failure of this
assumption is not really precise in terms of which variable influences which. The same is
true for failures of No Backwards Causation: it would leave us with possible influences
between the same pairs of variables—just that they are not direct and non-local but
indirect and zig zag in time.
So a failure of these two assumptions allows influences between the same pairs of vari-
ables but just differs in how these are spatio-temporal realised. The spatio-temporal fea-
tures, however, are neither crucial for the derivation nor for our present question (we have
said that we are interested in the causal structure not in its metaphysical realisation).
In our derivation Causal Einstein Locality and No Backwards Causation have served
as physical (or metaphysical) justifications for excluding influences between space-like
separated variables. But the argument does not essentially rely on this spatio-temporal
justification: the argument is formal and the formal function of the spatio-temporal
principles is just to exclude directed causal paths from one wing of the experiment to
the other. Crucuial for the derivation (and for our question) is just that some variables
are not causes of some others, so that certain probabilistic independencies (Local Fac-
torisation and Probabilistic Autonomy) hold. So it is clear that we can as well derive
the Bell inequalities from principles which directly state which variables cannot influence
another:
Causal Outcome Independence (COI): None of the outcomes is a direct
effect of the respectively other outcome relative to V 1.
Causal Parameter Independence (CPI): None of the outcomes is a
direct effect of its distant setting relative to V 1.
Causal Autonomy (CA): None of the settings directly influences the hid-
den variable λ relative to V 1.
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(V 1 is our usual set of variables, V1 = {α,β,a, b,ψ,λ}.) In the context of EPR
experiments, these three principles are extensionally equivalent to Causal Einstein Loc-
ality and No Backwards Causation, since they impose the same restrictions to causal
structures: given these three principles plus ECV, only local structures are possible.
Hence, Bell inequalities follow if we add the CMC and Causal Sufficiency1. This allows
to replace Causal Einstein Locality and No Backwards Causation in premise (P0) of the
causal Bell argument by the new principles:
(P0′) Exogeneity of Controlled Variables, the Causal Markov Condition, Causal
Sufficiency1, Causal Outcome Independence, Causal Parameter Independ-
ence and Causal Autonomy imply autonomy and Local Factorisation:
(ECV) ∧ (CMC) ∧ (CS1) ∧ (COI) ∧ (CPI) ∧ (CA)→ (A) ∧ (LF)
While the other premisses (P1) and (P2) remain unaltered, the new premise (P0′)
entails a new conclusion:
(C2′) At least one of the following principles fails: the Exogeneity of Controlled
Variables or the Causal Markov Condition or Causal Sufficiency1 or Causal
Outcome Independence or Causal Parameter Independence or Causal Autonomy:
¬(ECV) ∨ ¬(CMC) ∨ ¬(CS1) ∨ ¬(COI) ∨ ¬(CPI) ∨ ¬(CA)
The difference to the former conclusion is that in (C2) the metaphysical principles
Causal Einstein Locality and No Backwards Causation were at stake, while here it is
influences between certain variables (irrespective of their spatio-temporal realisation).
Thus, we have separated the spatio-temporal question from the question of the causal
structure: in the new form we can discuss which variable influences which without con-
sidering how these paths are spatio-temporally realised. It is important not to mix these
two questions. In the following we shall only consider the former: we shall make explicit
possible causal structures but we shall not care about how causal relations are embed-
ded in space-time. Especially, we explicitly allow for causal relations between space-like
separated variables. If we find that there is an influence between space-like separated
variables, e.g. between a setting and its distant outcome, we do not discuss whether it
is due to a non-local influence or an influence backwards and forwards in time. This is
an important but separate question, which we can and do leave open here. Note that
neglecting the spatio-temporal question also means omitting intervening variables back-
wards in time, such as µ in figure 10. This structure will now be depicted as shown in
figure 11: the causal path b→ µ→ β is replaced by a direct influence b→ β.
Having separated the question of spatio-temporal realisation from that of the causal
structure we nevertheless continue to speak of local and non-local causal relations and
structures. A local (non-local) causal relation is just one between time-like (space-like)
separated variables, e.g. a → α (a → β). A local (non-local) structure is one which
contains only local (some non-local) causal relations. But by qualifying a relation as, for
instance, non-local we do not mean to say anything about how the causal relation is in
fact embedded in space and time. The non-local relation might be embedded non-locally
or by backwards and forwards causation.
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2.4 Suggested causal structures
So if ECV, the CMC and Causal Sufficiency1 hold, we either have an influence between
the outcomes, or between a setting and its distant parameter, or between s setting and
the hidden variable (fig. 14–16). These are information about single causal relations—
but how do the complete structures look like in these cases? Bell’s argument does not
tell. It just requires that there must be one of these relations, but does not describe
the rest of the structure. Since violating Bell inequalities requires to have enough causal
dependencies, a maximal structure consistent with ECV and CS1 (fig. 17) will certainly
suffice. But what about weaker structures? Which arrows can we delete such that the
structure still allows a violation of Bell inequalities?
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 14: Violation of Causal Outcome In-
dependence
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 15: Violation of Causal Parameter
Independence
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 16: Violation of Causal Autonomy
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 17: Maximal structure
Actually, the most interesting cases are minimal structures, which may not lose any
arrow without losing their ability to violate Bell inequalities. We conjecture that they
look like the prototypes in figures 3, 4 and 6. But how do we know? Are there alternat-
ives? Which further argument besides Bell’s determines how these structures look like?
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The answer to the latter question is that structures with too few arrows, like those in
fig. 14–16, by the CMC yield independencies which are in conflict with the empirical
probability distribution. For instance, all three structures would yield I(α,ψ), which is
empirically wrong.8 This conflict is direct because it only requires comparing independ-
encies following from the structures with the empirical distribution; no Bell inequality
or other sophisticated moves are involved.
Therefore, we need further conditions, which guarantee consistency with the empirical
distribution (in the just described sense that the CMC does not yield independencies
which are empirically wrong). These conditions are:
(a) There is a directed causal path from the quantum state to each outcome
(ψ → . . .→ α and ψ → . . .→ β).
(b) There is a directed causal path from each setting to its local outcome (a→
. . .→ α and b→ . . .→ α).
These principles can be justified by the Causal Markov Condition. However, in this
case as well as in others, there is a more appropriate principle which is equivalent to the
CMC, but simplifies the reasoning considerably. We shall now introduce this principle,
before we come back to the conditions (a) and (b). The principle says (Pearl 2000,
p. 16ff; Spirtes et al. 2000, p. 43–46):
d-Separation Criterion: Two variables A and B in a causal graph are
probabilistically independent conditional on a set of variables C, if A and
B are d-separated relative to C.
The central concept ‘d-separation’ is a causal property which indicates how A and B
are related in a given causal structure. It is defined as follows:
d-separation: Two variables A and B in a causal graph are d-separated
relative to a set of variables C, if there is no active causal path between A
and B relative to C.
Active path: A causal path between two variables A and B is active
relative to C if all nodes on it are active. A node is active if and only if
– it is a non-collider and not in C
or
– it is a collider and it (or one of its causes) is in C.
Collider: A node is a collider on a causal path, if there are two incoming
arrows from that path.
8 It might seem unfamiliar that empirically the dependence ¬ I(α,ψ) holds, because in experiments
with maximally entangled quantum objects, I(α,ψ) is the case. However, the slightest deviation
from maximal entanglement yields the dependence; certain independencies of maximally entangled
objects are just due to special degeneracies / symmetries of maximal entanglement. Hence, here we
presume a statistics of non-maximal entangled objects.
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The d-separation criterion implies the same independencies as the CMC, but the
derivation procedure is much more elegant. For one can directly read off from a given
graph whether a pair of variables is implied to be independent given any set of conditional
variables. In contrast, by the CMC one can only read off independencies conditional on
all direct causes of one of the variables. All other independencies have to be derived
from these former independencies by logical relations.9 For instance, applied to the
local structure, the CMC directly only tells that the outcome α is independent of the
setting b conditional on its direct causes a, ψ and λ, i.e. I(α, b|{a,ψ,λ}). Without
further inferences the CMC does not tell, whether, e.g., the unconditional independence
I(α, b) holds. The d-separation criterion, however, does: the independence is not implied
because both causal paths between α and b, one via ψ and one via λ, are active due to
the fact that ψ and λ are non-colliders which do not appear in the conditional.
Since the d-separation criterion is equivalent to the CMC (both yield the same inde-
pendencies) but is much easier to apply, we shall now use it to justify the conditions (a)
and (b). More appropriately, we shall use the following equivalent principle:10
Causal Connection Principle (CCP): Two variables A and B are d-
connected relative to a set of variables C, if they are probabilistically de-
pendent relative to C, ¬ I(A,B|C).
d-connection: Two variables A and B in a causal graph are d-connected
relative to a set of variables C, if they are not d-separated relative to C.
Condition (a) can be derived from the empirical fact that in EPR experiments with
different non-maximally entangled states ψ the probabilistic dependencies ¬ I(α,ψ) and
¬ I(β,ψ) hold. By the causal connection principle, the former dependence requires that
there is an active causal path between ψ and α (otherwise the d-separation criterion or
the CMC, respectively, would imply the independence I(α,ψ)). Since the dependence
is unconditional, the path may not contain colliders. It is either a directed causal path,
ψ → α or ψ ← α, or a path with a common cause of ψ and α. Since the latter two
paths are forbidden by ECV, the former must hold. This path from ψ to α, could either
be direct, i.e. ψ → α, or indirect via the hidden variable, i.e. ψ → λ → α, or indirect
via the other outcome, i.e. ψ → β → α. Analogous causal paths from ψ to β prevent
inconsistency with to the other dependence ¬ I(β,ψ).
The justification for condition (b) is similar to that of (a): in experiments with non-
maximally entangled quantum objects, the outcomes depend on their local settings,
¬ I(α,a) and ¬ I(β, b). So, by the CCP, there must be an active causal path between
each setting and its local outcome. Due to ECV one can only have a directed causal
path from the setting to the outcome, i.e. a→ α and b→ β. This path can be a direct
influence, or it can be indirect via the respective other outcome, i.e. a → β → α or
b→ α→ β, or indirect via the latent common cause λ, i.e. a→ λ→ α or b→ λ→ β.
9 See the semi-graphoid axioms in (Pearl, 2000, p. 11).
10 Logically, the causal connection principle is just the contraposition of the d-separation criterion. The
name was recently introduced by (Schurz and Gebharter, preprint).
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So far for the justification and explication of the conditions (a) and (b). Finally, we
should note another condition which does not derive from empirical facts: the hidden
variable λ was introduced as a hidden common cause of the outcomes. According to
causal graph theory, there is no reason to account for latent variables unless they are
common causes. Hence, we also require:
(c) The hidden variable λ is a common cause of the outcomes.
So the minimal structures can be found by starting with one of the causal relations
necessary for violating Bell inequalities (fig. 14–16) and then adding causal paths which
fulfil conditions (a)–(c). We have seen that (a) and (b) can be realised in different
ways.11 Accordingly, there are several minimal structures, which we do not list here
all. We focus on the most plausible cases which fulfil (a) by direct influences and (b)
either by direct or by indirect influences via the hidden variable. This subset of minimal
structures is shown in figures 18 to 21. The first three are the prototypes from figures
3, 4 and 6 (figure 21 is a new structure which we have not considered so far). So we
have provided a clear argument that these prototypes are minimal structures fulfilling
both the indirect empirical requirements from the violation of Bell inequalities (if ECV,
the CMC and CS1 hold) as well as the direct empirical constraints (a) and (b) we have
considered in this section.
2.5 Against the standard view 1: a holistic interpretation scheme
We have provided a causal interpretation of the standard Bell argument and have spelled
out some of its consequences in terms of causal structures. What is the difference to
usual causal interpretations? First, we have consistently used causal graph theory, which
is by now not very common in the EPR literature. At every step, the argument is explicit
about precisely which principles are at stake. Most of the principles concern features
of causal structures which are clearly illustrated by associated graphs. Causal graph
theory also points out that besides structural features the translation of structures to
probabilistic facts needs special attention: by the CMC (or the d-seperation criterion
or the causal connection principle, respectively) it provides a clear connection between
causal structures and probabilistic facts.
Second, in the light of our argument the standard interpretation which associates
singular probabilistic conditions with a specific causal meaning becomes highly ques-
tionable. Consider, for instance, the usual claim that Local Factorisation is a locality
condition. It can easily be seen by causal graph theory that this is not true, because
Local Factorisation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for Einstein local-
ity. It is not sufficient because there can be non-local causal relations, for instance the
relation a Õ λ in an otherwise local structure (see fig. 22), and the CMC would still
imply Local Factorisation. Neither is Local Factorisation necessary for Einstein locality:
from a single causal claim like Einstein locality nothing follows on a probabilistic level,
11 Note that not all possibilities are consistent with another, e.g. a → β → α is inconsistent with
ψ → α → β, because it requires to both have α → β and α ← β. Furthermore, not all structures
which are composed in this way are minimal.
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Minimal structures which can violate Bell inequalities
(according to the standard Bell argument)
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 18: Minimal structure 1
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 19: Minimal structure 2
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 20: Minimal structure 3
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 21: Minimal structure 4
21
2 A causal interpretation of Bell’s theorem
simply because the translation principle, the CMC, is missing. But even assuming the
CMC, Local Factorisation does not follow; the other assumptions are needed as well.
Suppose, for instance, Causal Sufficiency1 failed, because, besides λ, there were another
latent common cause of the outcomes. Then, instead of Local Factorisation we had the
product form P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|βabψλ)P (β|bψλ), i.e. the outcome in the first factor,
α, would in general still depend on β and b due to the forgotten latent common cause.12
So there really is no correspondence between a single causal claim and one of the prob-
abilistic assumptions. Premise (P0) shows that only Einstein locality and the CMC and
No Backwards Causation and Causal Sufficiency1 and the CMC jointly imply that Local
Factorisation holds. So the only thing we can say is that, if Local Factorisation fails,
one of these causal assumptions cannot be true. But without further assumptions one
does not know which.
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 22: Non-local structure implying
Local Factorisation
This ambiguity remains if one uses Jarrett’s analysis (1984) that a failure of Local Fac-
torisation is equivalent to ‘Outcome Dependence or Parameter Dependence’. Without
further assumptions it is not justified—as it has become usual—to claim that the probab-
ilistic condition Outcome Dependence, ¬ I(α,β|a, b,ψ,λ), signifies an influence between
the outcomes (Causal Outcome Dependence) and the other probabilistic condition Para-
meter Dependence, ¬ I(α, b|a,ψ,λ)∨¬ I(β,a|b,ψ,λ), an influence between at least one
setting and its distant outcome (Causal Parameter Dependence). Infering Causal Out-
come Dependence from probabilistic Outcome Dependence is not valid. It is true, the
latter might be due to the former, but it might as well be due to other facts, e.g., another
latent common cause which has not been accounted for (i.e. Causal Sufficiency1 fails).
Similarly, probabilistic Parameter Dependence does not imply Causal Parameter De-
pendence (as in fig. 4). Here, the ambiguity is even more problematic for the standard
12 Since one does not condition on the additional latent common cause, there is an active causal path
between α and β via λ (λ is a non-collider and does not appear in the conditional), i.e. the two
variables are d-connected. There is also an active path between α and b via β and λ (β is a collider
which appears in the conditional). Hence, the CMC does not imply that they are independent. So,
except for certain special cases (non-faithful independencies) they are dependent.
22
2 A causal interpretation of Bell’s theorem
view. For one of the alternative structures which account for probabilistic Parameter
Dependence without being causally parameter dependent, is the direct cause structure
in figure 3: there is no direct influence from the setting b to its distant outcome α (i.e.
Causal Parameter Independence holds), but due to the indirect path b → β → α it is
nevertheless in general probabilistically parameter dependent.13 This counterexample
is delicate because direct cause structures are commonly regarded as the prototype for
structures which are probabilistically outcome dependent but parameter independent!
(According to the standard view, Parameter Independence is important because its vi-
olation is said to be incompatible with relativity.) However, the example shows that in
general one cannot have Outcome Dependence realised by an influence between the out-
comes without Parameter Dependence holding.14 The standard view’s model of quantum
non-locality does not seem to be well founded.
The upshot of all this is that the standard way to interpret Bell’s theorem, viz. to
directly associate probabilistic facts with a specific causal meaning, is flawed. Correlation
is not causation. A given probabilistic dependence allows for various different causal
interpretations. Especially one should not directly attach a causal meaning to Outcome
Dependence or Parameter Dependence. This is a first failure in the argument of the
standard view. Rather, we have found a kind of holistic interpretation scheme: only
a set of causal assumptions fixes the meaning of a certain probabilistic condition. So
the best one could say about the standard view is that it implicitly assumes the other
causal assumptions which are required for a sound interpretation. We stress, however,
that these assumptions are non-trivial. In this first part of the present paper we have
made these assumptions explicit. We have used causal graph theory to introduce an
appropriate set, which provides a clear causal interpretation of Bell’s theorem.
Our discussion of causally outcome dependent structures which are probabilistically
parameter dependent points to still another problem: even if one assumes an appropriate
set of causal assumptions, it is problematic to causally interpret a singular probabilistic
dependence (here: Outcome Dependence). For it might be that the causal assumptions
imply other probabilistic facts which are not desired or empirically inadequate (here:
Parameter Dependence). Causal graph theory tells us that one has to consider all
dependencies and independencies of given probability distribution. (It is our conditions
(a) and (b) which prevent such inconsistencies with the empirical distribution.) Only
interpretations of total probability distributions are sound, which is another holistic
feature of causal interpretations.
13 Parameter independence I(α, b|{a,ψ,λ}) ∧ I(β,a|{b,ψ,λ}) is not implied by the d-separation cri-
terion because the causal path from b to α via β is active.
14 Jones and Clifton (1993) have made explicit the extra probabilistic conditions under which Outcome
Dependence implies Parameter Dependence. They mention that this probabilistic scenario is quite
plausibly regarded as a direct cause structure, but they do not make the transition from probabilistic
to causal claims as clear as our causal graph theoretic approach does.
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3 Interpreting a stronger Bell argument
Having provided a causal interpretation of the standard Bell argument, we shall now
turn to a recent stronger version of Bell’s argument (Na¨ger, 2012). The method of
interpretation will be very much the same, but the results will differ from those of
the standard argument: we shall show that not only local structures but also direct
cause structures imply Bell inequalities. This will make the conclusion of the argument
considerably stronger.
3.1 A recent stronger version of Bell’s theorem
Na¨ger (2012) proves that Bell inequalities can be derived from weaker probabilistic as-
sumptions than autonomy and Local Factorisation. Upholding autonomy he shows that
the Bell inequalities do not only follow from local product forms of the hidden joint
probability P (αβ|abψλ) (esp. Local Factorisation), but also from certain non-local ones,
which he calls ‘weakly non-local’. In contrast to ‘strongly non-local’ product forms they
are characterised by the following principle:
No Probabilistic Bell Contextuality (NPBC): None of the outcomes
in the hidden joint probability depends probabilistically on both settings.
So, surprisingly, we can have a dependence on the distant parameters (in the following
three equations we underline variables which indicate an interesting dependence),
P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|bψλ)P (β|aψλ), (13)
or even a dependence between the outcomes,
P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|βaψλ)P (β|bψλ), (14)
or both,
P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|βbψλ)P (β|aψλ), (15)
and the conclusion still follows.15 Such weakly non-local distributions imply Bell in-
equalities as do local ones.
Based on this new derivation Na¨ger has formulated a stronger Bell argument on the
probabilistic level. It says:
(P1′) Probabilistic Autonomy and No Probabilistic Bell Contextuality imply Bell
inequalities:
(A) ∧ (NPBC)→ (BI)
(P2) Bell inequalities are empirically violated: ¬(BI)
15 There are further forms, see table 1 in (Na¨ger, 2012). But (14) and (15) are the strongest ones, which
yield the most far reaching results.
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(C1′) Probabilistic Autonomy or No Probabilistic Bell Contextuality fails:
¬(A) ∨ ¬(NPBC) (from P2 & P3, MT)
The conclusion of this argument is stronger than that of the standard Bell argument
because the failure of No Probabilistic Bell Contextuality excludes not only local product
forms but also weakly non-local ones. In the following we shall give this new argument a
causal interpretation. Our hope is that the interpretation of the stronger argument will
narrow the range of possible causal structures (and also weakens some of the other causal
conditions). We shall follow the same interpretation scheme as above. We formulate an
interpretation premise which is an implication from a set of causal assumptions (X′) to
those probabilistic conditions which by premise (P2′) imply Bell inequalities:
(P0′′) The causal assumptions (X′) imply autonomy and No Probabilistic Bell Con-
textuality:
(X′)→ (A) ∧ (NPBC)
(X′) stands for a conjunction of causal assumptions. Since it only has to imply No
Probabilistic Bell Contextuality instead of the stronger Local Factorisation, it is to be
expected that it can be made weaker than the set of causal assumptions in its predecessor
(P1′). If this were true, the new conclusion of the causal interpretation,
(C2′′) (X′) must fail: ¬(X′) (from P0′′ & C1′)
would be stronger. We now have to discuss, what the weakest form of (X) exactly is.
3.2 A new causal interpretation
To begin with, let us assume that (X′) includes ECV, the CMC and Causal Sufficiency1.
What we are looking for are further principles that restrict causal structures such that
the assumptions jointly yield Probabilistic Autonomy and No Probabilistic Bell Contex-
tuality.
Let us first consider autonomy: since autonomy is an unconditional independence
of λ and both settings, it is clear that it is implied by the d-separation criterion (or,
equivalently, by the CMC) if there is no active path from λ to any of the settings. What
do we have to require that there are no such paths? First, we can ignore paths with
colliders because they cannot be unconditionally active. Furthermore, ECV, which says
that the outcomes are exogenous variables, excludes a common cause of λ and one of
the settings as well as a directed causal path from λ to one of the settings. So the
only remaining possibility which might violate autonomy are directed causal paths from
the settings to the hidden variable λ. Since λ is a common cause of the outcomes,
the directed paths cannot lead via the outcomes. Neither can they lead via ψ, for ψ
is exogenous as well (ECV). Only a direct causal connection from the settings to the
outcomes can violate autonomy, a → λ or λ ← b. We exclude such influences by a
principle that we have already introduced: Causal Autonomy.
We now turn to the product forms of the hidden joint probability: which causal
assumptions do have to hold so that the implied product forms obey No Probabilistic
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Bell Contextuality? In order to find an appropriate principle, we need a link between
causal structures and these product forms. Fortunately, given ECV, the CMC and
Causal Sufficiency1, there is a clear correspondence between a causal structure and the
product form of the hidden joint probability; given a certain causal structure for the
variables in {α,β,a, b,ψ,λ}, the hidden joint probability has the following form:
P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|{direct causes of α})P (β|{direct causes of β}) (16)
The non-local common cause structure in figure 4, for instance, implies the hidden joint
probability P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|abψλ)P (β|bψλ).
The rule (16) follows straightforwardly from the assumptions we have made: by the
product rule (a theorem of probability theory), the hidden joint probability can in general
be written as
P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|βabψλ)P (β|abψλ) (17)
The CMC and Causal Sufficiency jointly guarantee that a variable becomes independent
of all variables which are not effects given its direct causes. So if we can show that
none of the variables in each of the conditionals on the right hand side in (17) is an
effect of the outcome in question, then the rule follows. This, however, is easy to show:
ECV guarantees that a, b and ψ are not effects of the outcomes. Neither is λ, for we
have introduced it as a hidden common cause of the outcomes. Finally, concerning β,
which appears in the conditional of α, we have to discern two cases: if β causes α or
if there is no causal relation between the outcomes at all, β is not an effect of α and
everything is fine. If, however, α causes β, one has to choose the equivalent product form
P (αβ|abψλ) = P (α|abψλ)P (β|αabψλ): in this form every variable in each conditional
is not an effect of the respective outcome, so the rule follows. So in any case (16) holds
(given ECV, the CMC and Causal Sufficiency1).
According to (16), a certain causal structure determines the form of the hidden joint
probability. In turn, by this rule, it is easy to find a generating causal structure for
any given form of the hidden joint probability: just assume that every variable in each
conditional is a direct cause of the respective outcome. Using the example from above
the other way round we can say that the product form P (α|abψλ)P (β|bψλ) is generated
by the non-local common cause structure in figure 4. With this observation it is easy
to formulate the corresponding causal principle to No Probabilistic Bell Contextuality
(which is the characteristic of product forms implying Bell inequalities). Suppose we
have a product form which obeys No Probabilistic Bell Contextuality, i.e. each of the
outcomes depends probabilistically at most on one setting. Then, by the rule we have
just derived, a generating causal structure must be such that each outcome has at most
one setting as its direct cause:
No Causal Bell Contextuality1 (NCBC1): None of the outcomes is
a direct common effect of both settings relative to the set of variables
{α,β,a, b,ψ,λ}.
If this principle and ECV, the CMC and Causal Sufficiency1 hold, then, by (16), No
Probabilistic Bell Contextuality follows. If also the structure in question obeys Causal
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Autonomy, Probabilistic Autonomy is implied as well. Then, Na¨ger’s stronger Bell
argument entails Bell inequalities. So the causal assumptions Causal Autonomy and No
Causal Bell Contextuality1 are the causal interpretation (X
′) of Na¨ger’s Bell argument.
The new first premise of the stronger Bell argument explicitly reads:
(P1′′) The Exogeneity of Controlled Variables, the Causal Markov Condition, Causal
Sufficiency1, Causal Autonomy and No Causal Bell Contextuality1 imply
Probabilistic Autonomy and No Probabilistic Bell Contextuality:
(ECV) ∧ (CMC) ∧ (CS1) ∧ (CA) ∧ (NCBC1)→ (A) ∧ (NPBC)
The set of five causal assumptions in the antecedent, which provides the causal inter-
pretation of the stronger Bell argument, differs from that of the standard argument,
(P1′), in that we have replaced Causal Outcome Independence and Causal Parameter
Independence by No Causal Bell Contextuality1.
3.3 Which structures imply Bell inequalities?
What difference does this replacement make for the causal structures implying Bell
inequalities? Up to this point we only have a very abstract understanding of this new
causal Bell argument, because we have not shown yet what No Causal Bell Contextuality1
specifically amounts to in terms of causal structures. Which causal structures fall under
No Causal Bell Contextuality1, and, hence, imply Bell inequalities?
The most interesting cases are, of course, maximal structures implying Bell inequal-
ities. Structures are ‘maximal’ if one cannot add any arrow to the structure without
violating any of the causal assumptions which restrict them (i.e. ECV, Causal Autonomy
and No Causal Bell Contextuality1). We can find such maximal structures if we look
for those structures which by rule (16) imply the maximal product forms (14) and (15)
falling under No Probabilistic Bell Contextuality. According to the rule an appropri-
ate structure for the first form is the one depicted in figure 23 (or its mirror image
structure which has α → β instead of α ← β; the generating structures are in general
not unique). Although there is a non-local causal relation between the outcomes, the
structure is allowed by No Causal Bell Contextuality1, because none of the outcomes is
a direct common effect of the settings. It is true, α is a common effect of the settings,
but only indirectly of b (via β); this is not ruled out by No Causal Bell Contextuality1.
The other maximal product form, (15), is generated by the structure in figure 24 (or
again its mirror image). It is consistent with No Causal Bell Contextuality1 because
each outcome is only a direct effect of its distant setting but not of its local one (α is
only an indirect effect of a via β).
Obeying all causal principles of the new Bell argument, each of the two structures in
figures 23 and 24 implies Bell inequalities. Hence, we have shown that there are non-
local causal structures which imply Bell inequalities! This means that some of the causal
principles of the standard Bell argument have been too strong: both structures violate
Causal Outcome Independence (because of the causal relation from one outcome to the
other) and that in figure 24 also violates Causal Parameter Independence (due to the
causal relations from each setting to its distant outcome). According to the standard
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Maximal causal structures implying Bell inequalities
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 23: Direct cause structure 1
ba
α β
ψ λ
gekreuzt mixed
Fig. 24: Direct cause structure 2
Bell argument these structures wrongly count as being able to violate Bell inequalities.
The causal interpretation of the stronger Bell argument, however, shows that this is not
the case: these structures do imply Bell inequalities. This makes explicit that the new
principle No Causal Bell Contextuality1 is weaker than its predecessors Causal Outcome
Independence and Causal Parameter Independence. According to the new argument
there are more structures which imply Bell inequalities: not only local structures but
also certain non-local ones do.
So far we have only considered maximal structures in figures 23 and 24. What other
structures are there that imply Bell inequalities according to the new argument? Max-
imality meant that one may not add arrows without producing an inconsistency with
the assumptions. However, removing any arrows from the maximal ones cannot yield
a conflict with the principles (for these only constrain possible arrows). By rule (16)
it is also clear that structures which derive from the maximal ones in this way have
weaker product forms and, hence, also imply Bell inequalities. Let us call the set of all
structures which one can gain by removing arrows from the maximal ones (including the
latter) ‘Bell structures’. For instance, erasing the connection α← β in figure 23, yields
the usual local structure (figure 12). This makes explicit that the local structures are a
proper subset of the Bell structures. Since up to now only local structures were thought
to imply Bell inequalities, structures which derive from the ones in figures 23 and 24 and
leave one of the non-local arrows in place are the news: these non-local Bell structures
do imply Bell inequalities as well. So the present set of causal assumptions extends the
set of structures which imply Bell inequalities by these non-local ones.
3.4 Minimal structures violating Bell inequalities
Since Bell inequalities are violated, (P3), this means that the new Bell argument from
(P0′′), (P1′) and (P3) possibly excludes more causal structures than the standard one.
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It has the new stronger conclusion:
(C2′′) At least one of the following principles fails: Exogeneity of Controlled Vari-
ables or the Causal Markov Condition or Causal Sufficiency1 or Causal
Autonomy or No Causal Bell Contextuality1:
¬(ECV) ∨ ¬(CMC) ∨ ¬(CS1) ∨ ¬(CA) ∨ ¬(NCBC1)
(from P0′′ & C1′)
I have said ‘possibly’ because in this form of the argument the violation might be ex-
plained by the failure of any of the causal assumptions. If, however, ECV, the CMC
and Causal Sufficiency1 hold, either Causal Autonomy or No Causal Bell Contextuality1
must fail. Then, the true causal structure cannot be any of the Bell structures, and, as
we have just seen, this rules considerably more causal structures out than the compar-
able result of the standard argument that the causal structure cannot be local. In this
sense the new causal Bell argument is stronger than the standard one.
So if ECV, the CMC and Causal Sufficiency1 hold, Bell structures are excluded. But
what does this result mean positively? Which structures exactly are allowed because
they can violate Bell inequalities? By what we have said up to now, it is clear that only
those structures can violate Bell inequalities which fulfil one of the following conditions:
(i) At least one of the settings directly influences the hidden common cause λ
(violation of Causal Autonomy, fig. 25).
or
(ii) At least one of the outcomes is a direct common effect of both settings
(violation of No Causal Bell Contextuality1, fig. 26).
These are the requirements from the stronger Bell argument. In section 2.4, we have
argued that appropriate structures for EPR experiments have to meet the further con-
ditions (a)–(c). Conditions (a) (there must be a directed path from the quantum state
to each outcome) and (b) (there must be a directed path from each setting to its local
outcome) guaranteed that the structures do not imply independencies which directly
contradict the empirical distribution, while (c) stated that the hidden variable λ was
defined as a common cause.
Minimal structures complying with these conditions can be found by choosing either
(i) or (ii) and then adding causal paths such that also (a)–(c) hold. We have said above
that (a) and (b) can be realised in different ways. Again, we do not list all of the possible
minimal structures, but we focus on the most plausible cases which fulfil (a) by direct
influences and (b) either by direct or by indirect influences via the hidden variable. This
fraction of minimal structures is shown in figures 27 to 29. Any structure which derives
from these by adding one or several arrows also implies Bell inequalities. The maximal
structure which one can arrive at in this way is shown in figure 30.
By this construction rule it is clear that there are many variants of causal structures
which can violate Bell inequalities. It is not informative to list them all. Rather, it is
instructive to come back to the prototypes of causal structures in figures 2 to 7, and
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Requirements for violating Bell inequalities
(according to the stronger Bell argument)
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 25: Violation of Causal Autonomy
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α β
ψ λ
Fig. 26: Violation of No Causal Bell
Contextuality1
ask which of these can violate Bell inequalities according to the new argument. The
answer is that the non-local common cause structure (fig. 4 = minimal structure in
fig. 29), the mixed structure (fig. 5, non-minimal) and the indirect structure (fig. 6
= minimal structure in fig. 28) are still allowed. (The superdeterministic structure was
already excluded by ECV, and the local structure by the standard Bell argument.) Thus,
compared to the standard Bell argument, we have excluded one further prototype, viz.
the direct cause structure (fig. 3). If ECV, the CMC and Causal Sufficiency1 hold, direct
cause structures cannot violate Bell inequalities because they imply them. This is the
bold and simple message of the stronger causal Bell argument.
4 Discussion
4.1 Against the standard view 2: unmasking a false choice
Excluding direct cause structures the stronger Bell argument refutes the standard view
that EPR correlations come about by an influence between the outcomes. It shows that
structures whose only non-local influence goes from one outcome to the other still imply
Bell inequalities (fig. 3). Such influences are too weak to produce a violation of Bell
inequalities.
Against the conclusion of the standard Bell argument, (C2′), the new result (C2′′)
demonstrates that there is no choice to be made between Causal Outcome Dependence
and Causal Parameter Dependence (if the other assumptions—ECV, CMC, CS1 and
CA—hold): there must be a failure of No Causal Bell Contextuality1, and since this
means that at least one outcome is a direct common effect of both settings, Causal
Parameter Dependence must hold. Causal Outcome Dependence, by contrast, does not
30
4 Discussion
Minimal causal structures which can violate Bell inequalities
(according to the stronger Bell argument)
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α β
ψ λ
Fig. 27: Minimal structure 1
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α β
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Fig. 28: Minimal structure 2
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Fig. 29: Minimal structure 3
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ψ λ
Fig. 30: Maximal structure
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play any crucial role: it might or might not hold.16
This result against the standard view is a causal analogue to Na¨ger’s (2012) claim that
Jarrett’s analysis ‘Outcome Dependence or Parameter Dependence’ is misleading on the
probabilistic level. Na¨ger shows that EPR correlations imply some kind of probabilistic
dependence between a setting and its distant parameter (while they might be outcome
dependent or not). Here we have derived a similar fact on the causal level: at least one of
the settings must influence its distant parameter. The option of the standard causal Bell
argument, ‘Causal Outcome Dependence or Causal Parameter Dependence’, presents us
with a false choice. One cannot avoid Causal Parameter Dependence (if ECV, the CMC,
CS1 and CA hold).
Suggesting and supporting options which are not available is a second failure of the
standard view. A first failure, we have said above (see section 2.5), was to naively associ-
ate Jarrett’s probabilistic conditions Outcome Dependence and Parameter Dependence
with causal meaning. Here we see that even a sound causal interpretation of the standard
argument provides a false choice between Causal Outcome Dependence and Causal Para-
meter Dependence. The standard Bell argument is just inappropriate to yield correct
details about the causal structure of EPR experiments.
4.2 Which assumption should be given up?
In the strongest conclusion of the Bell argument that we have reached, (C2′′), there are
five variants of how to explain the violation of Bell inequalities: either Exogeneity of
Controlled Variables or the Causal Markov Condition or Causal Sufficiency1 or Causal
Autonomy or No Causal Bell Contextuality1 fails. But which one is it? Which of
the assumptions has to be considered the culprit for the fact that Bell inequalities are
violated?
We have already expressed our loyalty to ECV throughout this paper. For failures of
ECV would allow that variables which are otherwise controlled can still be influenced.
The settings, for instance, are determined by an experimenter (or by a mechanism which
has been setup by an experimenter) to take on the values that they do. To claim that
nevertheless they are influenced by, say, a hidden variable λ, would amount to saying
that λ influences the experimenter or the mechanism in question or what else determines
the settings. This is very implausible. Moreover, it would be a mystery how the hidden
variables could influence every kind of system which happens to determine the setting
to the right value. Reducing one mystery, quantum entanglement, to another is not a
convincing explanation. We do not allow for such superdeterministic models of EPR
experiments, according to which, for instance, a hidden variable is a common cause of
both the outcomes and the settings (fig. 7).
Concerning Causal Sufficiency1 we cannot be sure that it actually holds. It might
be violated because besides λ there might be further hidden common causes, which we
have not considered in our set of variables V1 = {α,β,a, b,ψ,λ}. Due to ECV such
16Note, however, that Causal Parameter Dependence alone does not suffice. The non-local influence
from one setting to its distant outcome must be combined with a local influence from the other
setting to the same outcome. A non-local influence per se would not do.
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additional latent variables might only be common causes of any two (or more) variables
in {α,β,λ}. The important fact, however, is that such a failure of Causal Sufficiency1
alone cannot explain EPR correlations. For if only Causal Sufficiency1 fails one can
easily reformulate the argument to imply Bell inequalities again: just take into account
all forgotten hidden common causes such that Causal Sufficiency with respect to the
extended set of variables holds, and the derivation runs analogously as before.
For instance, suppose we have one further hidden common cause λ2 of the outcomes
in a direct cause structure (fig. 31). The new product form reads P (αβ|abψλλ2) =
P (α|βaψλλ2)P (β|bψλλ2) and an appropriate autonomy condition holds, P (ψλλ2|ab) =
P (ψλλ2).
17 By these two probabilistic assumptions, Bell inequalities follow analogously
as before. The causal interpretation of this argument assumes Causal Sufficiency2, i.e.
sufficiency with respect to the set of variables V2 = {α,β,a, b,ψ,λ,λ2}. (Accordingly,
some of the other assumptions have to be adapted slightly to the new set of variables.)
So if one starts with one of the Bell structures but forgets a hidden common cause, one
can always extend the argument such that Causal Sufficiency holds and Bell inequalities
are implied. Since a reformulation works for any number n of ignored latent common
causes, we conclude that a failure of Causal Sufficiency1 cannot explain the violation of
Bell inequalities.18
ba
α β
ψ λ λ2
Fig. 31: Direct structure with a second
hidden common cause λ2 of the
outcomes
17The idea of Probabilistic Autonomy is that the complete state of the photons at the source, which
includes the quantum state and all latent common causes, must be unconditionally independent of the
settings. Note that the quantum state and the latent common causes do not have to be independent
from another: it is consistent with Autonomy that there are influences from ψ to the latent common
causes or between the latent common causes, e.g. λ2 → λ.
18 Our result that even with several hidden common causes Bell inequalities follow is supported by a
recent series of papers (Graßhoff et al., 2005; Portmann and Wu¨thrich, 2007; Hofer-Szabo´, 2008),
who claim that Bell inequalities can be derived from ‘separate common causes’ (which is a special
case of the situation we have considered).
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A similar judgement should be made concerning the Causal Markov Condition. On
the one hand, it might fail and indeed it is not unlikely that it fails in the quantum world:
the well-known counterexamples (van Fraassen, 1982; Cartwright, 1988) to Reichenbach’s
principle of the common cause (Reichenbach, 1956) also violate the CMC, because the
former is an essential part of the latter. The examples show that in indeterministic
worlds there can be common causes which do not screen-off, i.e. which do not make
their effects probabilistically independent of another. Such non-screening-off common
causes are the only serious threat to the CMC. On the other hand, we claim that a
failure of the CMC in this way cannot explain the EPR correlations. This can be seen as
follows. Suppose there were a common cause which does not screen-off in any of the Bell
structures, say, the quantum state ψ in a local structure without latent common cause
(fig. 32). This would not suffice to explain EPR correlations because a common cause
which does not screen-off can only produce the same kind and strengths of correlations as
two common causes which jointly screen-off.19 The latter equivalent situation, however,
is just the local structure with hidden common cause λ, which we know to imply Bell
inequalities.20 Therefore, non-screening-off common causes in Bell structures cannot per
se explain the violation of Bell inequalities. A failure of the CMC does not suffice to
explain EPR correlations.
It might be criticised that quantum mechanics is a counterexample to this claim,
19 Formally, one can always redescribe a non-screening-off common cause C1 as C1 plus a latent common
cause C2, which coordinates the correlated effects and makes the pair C1C2 a screener-off. In order
to justify this claim, consider Cartwright’s example (1988) of a molecule in state S which decays into
two parts moving in opposite direction. With equal probability the states of the two parts are given
by their momenta p,−p or by p′,−p′, i.e. P (p,−p|S) = 1
2
= P (p′,−p′|S). So the states of the parts
after the decay are perfectly anti-correlated, but the state of the molecule S does not screen off the
correlation:
P (p,−p|S) = 1
2
6= P (p|S)P (−p|S) = 1
2
· 1
2
=
1
4
(18)
However, this situation can be redescribed as there being a two-valued latent common cause (λ =
λ0, λ1), which determines whether the parts will move along the axis p (if λ0 holds) or along the axis
p′ (if λ1 is present), i.e. P (p,−p|Sλ0) = 1 and P (p′,−p′|Sλ0) = 1. Thus, jointly with the latent
common cause λ the state of the molecule S does screen off:
P (p,−p|Sλ0) = 1 = P (p|Sλ0)P (−p|Sλ0) = 1 · 1 = 1 (19)
P (p,−p|Sλ1) = 0 = P (p|Sλ0)P (−p|Sλ0) = 0 · 0 = 0 (20)
P (p′,−p′|Sλ0) = 0 = P (p′|Sλ0)P (−p′|Sλ0) = 0 · 0 = 1 (21)
P (p′,−p′|Sλ1) = 1 = P (p′|Sλ1)P (−p′|Sλ1) = 1 · 1 = 1 (22)
This shows that common causes which do not screen off can be redescribed as screening off jointly
with a latent common cause. Note, however, that we do not claim that all cases of non-screening-off
common causes in fact invoke a latent common cause. Rather, we believe that true non-screening-off
common causes are possible. Here we just want to make the point that a common cause which does
not screen off can explain correlations only to the same degree as a normal common cause plus a
latent common cause.
20 The result does not change if one claimed that even given both common causes ψ and λ the outcomes
would not screen off from another. For this situation can be redescribed as there being another hidden
common cause λ2 such that ψ, λ and λ2 screen off—and these scenarios, according to which Causal
Sufficiency1 fails, we have just argued, can be reformulated as to imply Bell inequalities as well.
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ba
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ψ
Fig. 32: Local structure with a common
cause which does not screen-off
because it has the described structure (ψ is a common cause which does not screen-off
in a local graph) but violates Bell inequalities. This, however, is not correct: besides
a common cause which does not screen-off, quantum mechanics involves an influence
from one of the settings to its distant outcome. We shall justify this claim in section 4.3
below.
The only remaining assumptions whose failure might reasonably account for EPR
correlations are Causal Autonomy and No Causal Bell Contextuality1. We have already
made explicit in section 3.4 which structures are required if one of these conditions fails:
either there is an influence from one setting to the hidden variable λ or one outcome is
directly influenced by both settings. This seems to offer a choice between two basic types
of violating Bell inequalities. However, we emphasise here that this is only apparently
so because there is a common idea behind both alternatives:
Causal Bell Contextuality2: One of the outcomes is a common effect of
both settings, either directly (violation of No Causal Bell Contextuality1) or
(partly) indirectly via the hidden variable λ (violation of Causal Autonomy).
One outcome being the common effect of both settings is the main idea of what EPR
correlations require in causal terms.21
One might object that a violation of Causal Autonomy does not by itself imply that
one of the outcomes is a common effect of the settings. This is true. But an influence
from one setting to the hidden variable, say, b → λ, does imply the alleged fact if
we involve the conditions (b) and (c) from above (see section 2.4). The latter says
that λ is a common cause of the outcomes, so b influences both outcomes via λ. The
21Note that it does not suffice that one outcome is a common effect of both settings indirectly via the
other outcome (i.e. a direct cause structure 3). There are crucial differences between an influence
mediated by λ and one mediated by one of the outcomes: first, the outcomes are two valued (λ can
in principle have infinitely many values) and, second, it is an empirical fact that there are perfect
(anti-)correlations of the outcomes if the settings agree (disagree by 90◦). (Since λ is hidden, we do
not know whether similar facts hold there.) Due to these two key facts direct cause structures imply
Bell inequalities (see Na¨ger, 2012).
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former condition says that there is a directed causal path from each setting to its local
outcome, thus a must influence α. Hence, α is a common effect of both settings, if
Causal Autonomy is violated by b → λ (and mutatis mutandis for violations a → λ).
This can be seen in the minimal structures which violate Causal Autonomy (fig. 27
and 28).22
4.3 The causal structure according to quantum mechanics
Having discussed general principles and structures we shall now turn to the question
which specific causal structure quantum mechanics has. Quantum mechanics is widely
assumed to have a direct structure. In fact, one of the main motivations for the standard
view (Probabilistic and Causal Outcome Dependence) seems to have been the believe
that this is the choice that quantum mechanics suggests. By what our argument in
this paper, however, it has become clear that quantum mechanics cannot have a direct
structure—because otherwise it could not violate Bell inequalities.
Which structure then? Against the standard view, Cartwright has argued that EPR
correlations according to quantum mechanics come about by a common cause which
does not screen off:
. . . the quantum state consequent on the interaction operates, in conjunc-
tion with the separated apparatuses, as a joint cause of the results in each
wing, with no direct causal connection between one wing and the other.
(Cartwright, 1989, p. 243)
We interpret this claim as suggesting a structure like the one in figure 32—but this
cannot be true either. For we have argued above that correlations brought about merely
by common causes which do not screen-off, i.e. without any connection between the
wings, are too weak as well.
So again: what is the causal structure of quantum mechanics? We agree with
Cartwright that quantum mechanics involves a common cause which does not screen
off, but we shall show that additionally it involves an influence from one setting to its
distant outcome. We shall now give an argument for this claim. The idea is to endow the
formalism of (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics with a causal interpretation. Since
here we have a full-fledged formalism, we can use a more direct interpretation method
than above: we write down the quantum mechanical description of processes in an EPR
experiment and directly interpret them in a causal way. The criterion of a variable X
causing another Y in this procedure is that X is among the variables which determine
Y (or determine the probability of Y ) according to the most detailed description of the
formalism. This amounts to reading the quantum mechanical formalism as a kind of
structural equation model and associating the usual causal meaning, i.e. to interpret the
free variables as causes and the dependent variables as effects.
22 Indeed, if b violates Causal Autonomy by b→ λ and a would not influence its local or distant outcome,
i.e. it would not be a cause at all, Bell inequalities would follow trivially. But if a influences any of
the other variables (consistent with ECV), one of the outcomes is a common effect of a and b, i.e.
Bell inequalities are not implied any more and can be violated.
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We describe the experiment in the laboratory frame and assume that one of the
measurements is (at least slightly) earlier than the other (here: measurement at B
before measurement at A). A detailed quantum mechanical description of one run of
an EPR experiment comes in seven steps, which are as follows (one can find the causal
sub-structure for each step (1)–(7) in figure 33):
(1) At the source, quantum mechanics ascribes a joint entangled polarisation state to
the photons A and B, e.g.
ψAB =
1√
2
(|+z〉A|+z〉B + |−z〉A|−z〉B). (23)
|+z〉A means that photon A is polarised in the z-direction, while |z−〉A means that it is
polarised perpendicular to that direction (and analogously for states of photon B). An
entangled state ψAB cannot be written as a product of one state for A and one for B,
so the single photons have no defined states, only the compound system has. While the
photons move to the measurement devices the polarisation state does not change.
We assume a setup with two-channel measurement devices, i.e. a polarising beam
splitter (or a similar analyser) divides the beam into one with polarisation parallel and
another perpendicular to the measurement direction. Photons in each beam are re-
gistered by a detector, so there are two detectors per device. (Compared to one-channel
setups with a polarisation filter and one detector the former has the advantage to clearly
separate between analysis and measurement process; for filters already absorb the per-
pendicular beam.)
(2) When the first photon, say B, passes the analyser, its state is split up according
to the basis defined by the orientation of the device, b. So the state ψAB, which is
given in arbitrary basis (in our example the z-Basis), is now expanded relative to the
b-basis. If ψAB is rotationally invariant in the plane of the measurement settings (as in
our example), the new state ψ′AB is form-invariant:
ψ′AB =
1√
2
(|+b〉A|+b〉B + |−b〉A|−b〉B). (24)
We interpret the new state ψ′AB as an effect of the former state ψAB and the measure-
ment setting b.
(3) The presence of detectors at B triggers that the entangled state ψ′AB collapses
indeterministically, in our example either onto |+b〉A|+b〉B or onto |−b〉A|−b〉B (with
probability 12 , respectively). This is the central step in the coming about of EPR correl-
ations. It seems natural to interpret it such thatψ′AB and the presence of a detector,DB,
cause the new polarisation state. However, as this new state is a product state, each
photon now possesses its own separate state, ψA or ψB, respectively. So we should
not say that ψ′AB and DB cause one joint state but rather that ψ
′
AB decays into two
separate states, and the decay is triggered by DB. The most plausible reading of this
process is that DB brings ψ
′
AB into a new state ψ
′′
AB which is perfectly similar to ψ
′
AB
but is disposed to collapse instantly. Finally, the indeterministic decay of ψ′′AB into the
two states ψA and ψB should be understood as the former being a common cause of
the latter two states.
37
4 Discussion
So far for the causal structure of this crucial step. The associated probabilities are:
P
(
|+b〉A|+b〉B
∣∣∣ψ′′AB) = 12 (25)
P
(
|−b〉A︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψA
|−b〉B︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψB
∣∣∣ψ′′AB) = 12 (26)
One can see that the common cause ψ′′AB makes the separate states ψA and ψB perfectly
correlated (according to our example). However, and this is another important feature
of this central process in EPR experiments, the probabilities imply that the common
cause ψ′′AB does not screen-off the correlation between the new photon states:
23
P
(
ψAψB
∣∣∣ψ′′AB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
2
6= P
(
ψA
∣∣∣ψ′′AB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
2
P
(
ψB
∣∣∣ψ′′AB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
2
(27)
We represent the non-screening-off of ψ′′AB by a bow between its outgoing arrows in the
causal graph.
This was the crucial part of the quantum mechanical story for entangled states. The
rest is unsurprising and can be told quickly:
(4) When photon B is in state ψB = |+b〉B it gives a count at detector β+, otherwise
(when it is in state ψB = |−b〉B) at β−. So it seems obvious that ψB influences β.
(5) When photon A in state ψA = |+b〉A (or ψA = |−b〉A) reaches the analyser, the
measurement direction a determines the basis relative to which ψA is expanded. This
gives a new state:
ψ′A = cos(a− b)|+a〉A + sin(a− b)|−a〉A (28)(
or ψ′A = − sin(a− b)|+a〉A + cos(a− b)|−a〉A
)
(29)
We interpret this procedure as a and ψA causing ψ
′
A.
(6) The presence of detectors at A, DA, triggers that the state ψ
′
A collapses, either
onto ψ′′′A = |+a〉A or onto ψ′′′A = |−a〉A.24 As in step (3) we understand the triggering as
DA and ψ
′
A bringing about a state ψ
′′
A, identical to ψ
′
A save that it collapses instantly
into one of the possible states ψ′′′A . Thus we say that DA and ψ
′
A are causes of ψ
′′
A, and
the latter causes ψ′′′A .
(7) Finally, when photon A is in state ψ′′′A = |+a〉A it is registered at detector α+,
otherwise (when it is in state ψ′′′A = |−a〉A) at α−. As on the other wing, it seems
obvious that the measurement outcome at A, α, is solely determined by ψ′′′A .
23This case is perfectly similar to the examples by van Fraassen (1982) and Cartwright (1988).
24The probabilities for the different alternatives are:
P
(
ψ′′′A = |±a〉A
∣∣∣ψ′A = |±b〉A, DA) = cos2(a− b) (30)
P
(
ψ′′′A = |∓a〉A
∣∣∣ψ′A = |±b〉A, DA) = sin2(a− b) (31)
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The detailed causal graph for these seven steps according to quantum mechanics is
shown in figure 33. Besides the five empirically accessible variables that we have used
so far, it contains nine more variables. So how can we relate this detailed result to our
prototypes? The answer is that we have to eliminate all extra variables. Eliminating
a variable x from the set of considered variables means to replace all incoming and
outgoing arrows of x by arrows from each direct cause of x to each direct effect of x.
A simple example for this procedure is demonstrated in figures 34 and 35. If we apply
the same method to the detailed causal structure of quantum mechanics (fig. 33) and
eliminate all variables which do not belong to the set we have used so far (except the
true common cause ψAB), we arrive at the structure in figure 36.
b
a
α
β
ψAB
ψAB
DBψAB’’
’
ψA
ψA
ψA
ψB
’’
’
DA
(1)
(2)
(3a)
(3b)
(4)
(5)
(6a)
(7) ψA
(6b)
’’’
Fig. 33: Detailed causal structure according to quantum mechanics
This structure involves a common cause which does not screen off. However, it is not
the quantum state at the source which is the true common cause, but it is the entangled
quantum state which has passed the first analyser, and, hence, has been affected by one
of the settings (here: b). Therefore, its subsequent decay transfers the influence of this
setting to the distant outcome, so there is a directed path from the setting b to the
distant outcome α. This, however, does not mean that quantum mechanics is a non-
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wv
y z
x
Fig. 34: Example of a causal structure
wv
y z
Fig. 35: Eliminating variable x from
structure 34
ba
α β
ψAB
ψAB’’
Fig. 36: Reduced causal structure ac-
cording to quantum mechanics
ba
α β
ψ λ
Fig. 37: Structure 36 in the usual vari-
able scheme
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local common cause structure (fig. 4). For the influence is not direct but mediated via
a latent common cause ψ′′AB. In our considerations so far the role of a latent common
cause was played by a variable which we have called λ. Here it is crucial to recall that λ
was not necessarily identical to hidden variables but could be any latent common cause
located anywhere. In this situation, λ is the quantum state ψ′′AB which has passed the
first analyser, which gives us the structure in figure 37. That structure is similar but not
identical to the minimal indirect structure in figure 27. There are two differences: first,
according to the former the latent common cause does not screen off, and, second, the
directed paths from ψ to each outcome (which must hold according to condition (a)) is
not direct but indirect via λ.
Thus, in our scheme of causal structures, quantum mechanics has an indirect struc-
ture! Neither it is a direct structure, as the standard view says, nor is it a local common
cause structure with a non-screening-off common cause, as Cartwright has proposed.
Even more surprisingly, the quantum mechanical structure we have found does not con-
form to any of the prototypes which are commonly discussed! But it is in accordance
with the argument we have developed in this paper: it violates Causal Autonomy as well
as the Causal Markov Condition.
4.4 The meaning of Bell inequalities
Another lesson of our argument concerns the meaning of Bell inequalities: what do we
know about a system if we learn that it fulfils or violates Bell inequalities? Do we learn
anything about its causal structure or about its spatio-temporal realisation?
It might sound surprising but the logic of the Bell argument has it that a system
obeying Bell inequalities does not give you any information about it. Normally Bell
inequalities are so closely linked to the notion of locality that one might have got the
impression that obeying them is a necessary and sufficient condition thereof. However,
our argument only shows that local structures (plus some extra conditions) imply Bell
inequalities—but not the other way round. No matter which causal structure a system
has, whether the influences are local or non-local, whether it is causally Bell contextual2
or not, in all these cases Bell inequalities can hold. Fulfilling Bell inequalities does
not have any causal or spatio-temporal meaning, especially not that the causal structure
must be local. It is true, we have derived that certain structures, for instance local
ones, necessarily obey Bell inequalities. But even those which do not, because they are
causally Bell contextual2, still can obey Bell inequalities. Causal Bell Contextuality2 is
only a necessary condition for violating Bell inequalities.
In turn, however, this means that we do learn something about a system if it viol-
ates Bell inequalities. We then know that the system’s causal structure must be Bell
contextual2 (if ECV holds). Violating Bell inequalities does have a causal meaning. We
should stress, however, that its meaning does not refer to singular causal connections.
It does not mean that there must be a causal connection of this or that sort. Rather
it indicates that there must be the right combination of influences, viz. that one of the
outcomes is a common effect of the settings. Thus, violating Bell inequalities indicates
properties of a causal structure, not the existence of singular causal connections like
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Causal Outcome Dependence or Causal Parameter Dependence.
Besides information about its causal structure (which variable influences which), can
we also infer anything about a system’s spatio-temporal realisation, if we learn that it
violates Bell inequalities? Against a common view that the violation of Bell inequalities
implies that there is a non-locality of some kind, here we have shown that a violation of
Bell inequalities does not per se imply anything about the spatio-temporal realisation
of its influences. For we could separate the problem which variable influences which
from the spatio-temporal realisation (section 2.3). Our argument, which relied upon the
violation of Bell inequalities, told us something about the former question but not about
the latter. The violation of Bell inequalities provides information about which variable
influences which but not about the fact whether there is a non-local influence or not.
In the typical setup it only says that there are influences between space-like separated
variables, e.g. one setting and its distant outcome; but these can be realised either
directly non-local (fig. 4), or indirectly non-local via a hidden variable at the source
(fig. 6), or indirectly backwards and forwards in time (zig-zag causation, fig. 10). Our
result leaves this question open. (Especially, we have not touched the question whether
and how such structures are compatible with relativity.)
To sum this point up: intrinsically, the violation of Bell inequalities is not about
spatio-temporal features (non-locality) but about certain combinations of influences. It
implies a minimal structural property which variables have to influence which, viz.
that at least one of the outcomes is a common effect of both settings (Causal Bell
Contextuality2). Only by further arguments a non-locality can be inferred.
4.5 Agreement with information theoretic results
Finally, we come back to the information theoretic results of Maudlin (2002) and Pawlowski
et al. (2010) that we mentioned at the start. How does our conclusion, that at least one
of the outcomes must be a common effect of both settings, relate to their result, that
at least one of the outcomes must depend on the information about both settings?
(Let us call the latter kind of dependence ‘informational dependence’.) The two results
sound very similar. Indeed, if ‘depending on the information of’ were identical to ‘being
influenced by’, the two results would be the same. However, this is not the case. Inform-
ational dependence is more like a correlation (probabilistic dependence): a variable X
might depend on the information of another variable Y without there being any influ-
ence from Y to X. Just as for correlations, the influence might be the other way round
or there might be a common cause of the two variables. In both cases the value of X
can depend on information about the value of Y . Hence, the relation of informational
dependence to causal facts seems similar to that of probabilistic dependence to causal
facts. There is no one-to-one correspondence, and the translation is subject to multiple
possible fallacies. Only with additional assumptions and clear principles the translation
can be reliable.
Therefore, Maudlin’s unmediated leap from ‘[informational ] dependence on the dis-
tant polarizer setting is crucial’ to ‘any successful theory must postulate some influence
of a distant “parameter” (i.e. the polarizer angle) on the response of a local photon’
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(my emphasis) is not warranted without further justification. In this paper, we have
made explicit the assumptions that one needs in order to do a similar inference from
probabilistic facts to causal ones. It is likely that very analogous principles would do the
same job for Maudlin’s case. In fact, we should use the principle ECV and modify the
Causal Markov Condition from relating causal and probabilistic facts to relating causal
and informational facts:
Causal-informational Markov condition (CIMC): A variable A in a
given causal structure is informationally independent of its non-effects B
given information about its direct causes C.
Then, with these principles, we could justify Maudlin’s leap from his result that
one of the outcomes must depend informationally on both settings to Causal Bell
Contextuality2 as follows. Since the direction of inference is against the direction of
the (CIMC) we have to proceed indirectly: suppose Causal Bell Contextuality2 does not
hold, e.g. because both outcomes are only effects of their local settings (but not of their
distant ones). Moreover, by ECV, which says that the settings cannot be effects, there
is no other causal connection between the outcomes and their distant parameters: there
cannot be a common cause of an outcome and one of the settings, and neither can there
be a causal relation from an outcome to the setting. But then, by the CIMC25 each
outcome would be informationally independent of its distant setting—which contradicts
Maudlin’s result. Hence, one of the assumptions in the short argument we have made
must be false. If ECV and the CIMC hold, it can only be the failure of Causal Bell
Contextuality2 which—contrary to our premisses—must be wrong.
This is a causal interpretation of Maudlin’s result. It has the same causal conclusion,
namely that Causal Bell Contextuality2 holds, as our causal interpretation of the stronger
Bell argument. It also has the same assumptions: both arguments proceed from EPR
correlations (which violate Bell inequalities), ECV and the Causal Markov Condition,
either in its original form CMC or in the form of the CIMC. In this sense, our causal
Bell argument is in agreement with a causal interpretation of the information theoretic
results.26
Being the stable result of two independent approaches—an information theoretic
approach via EPR correlations and a probabilistic approach via the violation of Bell
inequalities—Causal Bell Contextuality2 is a good candidate for becoming the new stand-
25Note that here we need not assume Causal Sufficiency1 because ECV already forbids common causes
of an outcome and its distant setting.
26We should note that there is also a sense in which the information theoretic approach outdoes our
causal argument: the former explicitly determines the amount of information about the settings
which is needed for reproducing the EPR correlations. Maudlin calculates that on average 1.174 bits
of information must be transmitted about the distant parameter. This provides another explanation,
why a direct structure cannot reproduce the correlations: in a direct structure one of the parameters
influences the distant outcome via the local outcome. Since the outcome is a two-valued variable, it
can maximally code one bit of information about its local setting—which is not enough to violate
Bell inequalities. By the same reasoning it follows that in indirect models where the information of
the distant setting is transferred via the hidden variable, the hidden variable cannot be two-valued.
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ard view: EPR correlations require that one of the outcomes is a common effect of both
settings.
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